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Chapter  
Electronic Purchasing Consortia: A Future Procurement 
Direction? 
Bernd Huber, Edward Sweeney, Austin Smyth 
 
 
SUMMARY. In literature, there has been little empirical research 
investigation on purchasing consortium issues focusing on a detailed 
analysis of information and communication technology (ICT) based 
procurement strategies. Electronic purchasing consortia (EPC) enable 
purchasing organisations, to varying degrees, to electronically conduct 
tasks that are necessary for the management of demand aggregation of two 
or more legal entities, provide efficient ICT-based communication 
infrastructures and rely more on electronic communication than face-to-
face contact. Therefore, there is a need to relate the term EPC to academic 
literature and thus empower clearer analysis, which is addressed at 
academics and purchasing professionals alike. Based on the empirical 
evidence of case studies and a survey among e-Marketplaces / procurement 
service providers (PSPs) in the automotive and electronics industry sectors, 
an overall statement is proposed: Effective participation in electronic 
purchasing consortia can have the potential to enhance competitive 
advantage. Implementation therefore requires a clear and detailed 
understanding of the major process structures and drivers at the e-
Marketplace / PSP level of analysis. 
1. Introduction 
Both academics and practitioners have become very innovative in 
developing new strategic procurement concepts (such as early supplier 
involvement) in order to administer buyer-supplier relationships more 
effectively (van Weele, 2000). One of the main reasons is the concentration 
on core competencies at the company level, which led to a significant 
increase of sourcing activities. In the literature however, there has been little 
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empirical research investigation on purchasing consortium issues focusing 
on a detailed analysis of ICT-based procurement strategies.  
According to Hendrick (1997), a purchasing consortium is “a formal or 
informal arrangement, where two or more organisations, who are separate 
legal entities, collaborate among themselves, or through a third party, to 
combine their individual needs for products from suppliers and to gain the 
increased pricing, quality, and service advantages associated with volume 
buying”. Arnold (1996) specifies some constitutional features for co-
operation in general: “Independence of co-operation members is a criteria 
used by law to distinguish co-operation from merger. That causes tensions 
between autonomy and dependence. The membership in a co-operation is 
voluntary; nobody should be forced to participate. The main interest of the 
co-operation is an ex ante matching of plans or co-ordination of single 
interest, normally in a company’s function like purchasing etc. The main 
goal of a co-operation is to reach better economical results for all co-
operation partners.”  
Essig (1999) notes that a purchasing consortium may be just one, but an 
important element of a supply strategy and may be combined with other 
effective sourcing strategies such as global sourcing, single sourcing, system 
sourcing, and other strategies. The selection of available sourcing concepts 
characterises the supply strategy (see Figure 1). Pooled purchasing is a 
strategic task of purchasing management that should be firmly rooted in the 
purchasing processes, procedures and policies of a corporation (Essig, 
2000). However, academic research in purchasing consortia overall and in 
particular in EPC is therefore quite limited because purchasing consortia 
have traditionally not been very well adopted within industry. Conceptual 
and empirical articles are scarce. Few researchers have analysed purchasing 
consortia: For example, Essig (2000) examined research in purchasing 
consortia both in the Anglo-Saxon countries and in Germany, whereas 
Hendrick (1997) has analysed a blueprint for the formation of purchasing 
consortia by survey research among the Fortune 500 in the United States. 
With the advent of ICT such as the Internet, there may be better entry 
options for the formation and management of purchasing consortia to 
enhance their effectiveness and efficiency level. Electronic purchasing 
consortia (EPC) enable purchasing organisations, to varying degrees, to 
electronically conduct tasks that are necessary for the management of 
demand aggregation of two or more legal entities, provide efficient ICT-
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based communication infrastructures and rely more on electronic 
communication than face-to-face contact. 
Figure 1 The Sourcing Toolbox 
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Individual Sourcing Consortium Approach 
Source: Essig (2000) 
While aforementioned researchers do not discuss ICT in relation to 
purchasing in any great detail, Quayle (2002) surveyed SMEs to comment 
on the feasibility and desirability of a purchasing consortium using e-
Commerce. There was a mixed reaction to the concept. Some 70% of 
respondents thought that such a consortium was desirable but 60% of those 
considered that it might not be feasible. That as one of the reasons why 
Quayle recommended that research is required to investigate the operational 
characteristics and constraints of such consortia. 
Moreover, Corsten and Zagler (1999) describe various tasks required for 
EPC management. They report about an action research project on 
purchasing consortia and Internet technologies. The starting consortium 
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consisted of seven industry partners, predominantly from the machining 
industry in the Lake Constance area. The intention was to develop an 
Internet platform where SMEs can exchange knowledge, pool demand and 
attract suppliers. However, their study did not include important research 
issues such as the empirical level of EPC adoption with regard to industry 
sectors’ structures and anti-trust limitations, a categorisation of EPC 
management structures and scope, revenue models, etc. that are explained 
and elaborated on in more detail in the following. The lack of studies that 
focus on ICT-supported purchasing consortia provide room for 
improvement in both managerial and academic research.  
2. Theory Background 
Pooled sourcing strategies are not a new concept. However, they have 
been mainly evolving in the public sector, where co-operative purchasing 
has been practised in non-profit institutions (e.g. universities). Therefore, 
when exploring the most relevant approaches to pooled sourcing in 
literature in general, co-operative purchasing models in the public sector are 
primarily analysed (e.g. Housley, 1983). However, co-operative purchasing 
is but one of the entire global pooled procurement strategy terms. Due to the 
concentration on core competencies, the trend of industrial enterprises 
towards the formation of strategic demand aggregation alliances started 
mainly in the last two decades and is described as consortium purchasing 
(Essig, 1999). According to Major (1997), a purchasing consortium is an 
offshoot of the more traditional buying group, the co-operative. Harland 
(2002) confirms that it was not until the 1990s that any substantive 
empirical research of supply across inter-organisational networks was 
undertaken.  
However, the theoretical foundation for EPC is complex, going well 
beyond the field of purchasing. As stated by Amit and Zott (2001), no single 
strategic management theory can fully explain the value creation potential 
of e-Business. They note that rather, an integration of the received 
theoretical perspectives on value creation and a multi-perspective approach 
is needed, as “(…) virtual markets broaden the notion of innovation as they 
foster new forms of collaboration among firms (rather than merely new 
products or production processes) and involve new exchange mechanisms 
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and unique transaction methods”. An integration of strategic management 
theories is required to situate EPC in literature.  
The resource-based theory (e.g. Barney, 1991) and the positioning 
stream (e.g. Porter, 1985) to competitive advantage have not addressed 
issues where industrial firms have not as such developed critical resources 
and capabilities but in co-operation with other firms. This theoretical 
perspective suggests that competitive advantage can also be developed 
through inter-firm co-operation and links. That is why the theory of strategic 
networks and alliances (e.g. Gulati, 1998; Jarillo, 1988), which are based on 
a continuum between market and hierarchy, is very relevant to EPC as a 
further paradigm to competitive advantage.  
According to Essig (1999), a purchasing consortium represents a hybrid 
institution between market and hierarchy because partners combine their 
purchasing power but still continue to exist as separate companies. Based on 
the model of transaction cost and production cost theory, size and volume 
obviously effect economies of scale and scope. Corsten and Zagler (1999) 
state that electronic purchasing consortia may exploit synergetic potentials 
of economies of scale and scope (e.g. Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988) 
without the diseconomies of increased transaction and communication costs 
(e.g. Williamson, 1975). Symbiosis is the driver and a prerequisite for 
successful consortia (Essig, 1999). However, the effects are diminishing 
with increased asset specificity. Synergy achieved from network 
relationships can provide the foundation why electronic purchasing 
consortia are formed. Rozemeijer (2000) argues that synergy is all the new 
value that can be added through the organisation and the structure of 
interrelationships between independent units.  
However, EPC theory requires the integration of virtual structures in 
strategic alliance networks and virtual organisations (e.g. Bakos and Treacy, 
1986; Malone et al., 1987) as well as strategies in dis- or reintermediation 
(e.g. Wigand and Benjamin, 1996) and in e-Procurement (e.g. Gebauer and 
Zagler, 2000) to fully explain EPC. Traditionally, the lack of integration and 
communication infrastructures was regarded as one of the biggest barriers 
preventing the adoption and success of purchasing consortia. Electronic 
purchasing consortia, as a network enabler, can potentially offer a more 
efficient communication infrastructure with lower transaction costs (Corsten 
and Zagler, 1999). Davenport and Short (1990) confirm that ICT systems 
are one of the most powerful devices to shrink co-ordination costs in 
network approaches. Metamediaries such as e-Marketplaces and 
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procurement service providers can enable firms to adopt effective e-
Procurement systems. Replacing expensive EDI solutions governed by only 
one buyer in a closed system, low entry costs, fast return on investment and 
protection of existing EDI investment, recent developments in XML-
programming, are all reasons for the transformation of the supply chain into 
a network by Internet technologies (Richmond et al., 1998). According to 
the US Federal Trade Commission (USFTC, 2000), “the aggregating power 
of the Internet can overcome circumstances where otherwise the cost of 
information gathering outweighs the value of the surplus”. 
Therefore, the success of electronic purchasing consortia may be 
impelled to a large degree by advances in ICT. However, van Weele (2000) 
reports that most organisations lack an effective communications and 
information infrastructure, which may organise, support and facilitate the 
highly complex and often rapidly changing interfaces among the 
organisational entities and disciplines involved in purchasing processes. 
Therefore, the configuration and co-ordination necessary for e-Procurement 
strategies have of late received an increasing amount of research attention. 
Nontheless, Knudsen (2002) points out that there are still some uncertainties 
as to how the overall performance of purchasing departments can be 
improved by e-Procurement. 
E-Procurement solutions and concepts are very diverse and have many 
different meanings. de Boer et al., (2002) note in that respect that the 
potential merit of various e-Procurement concepts, such as electronic 
catalogue systems and software, electronic auctions, intelligent agent 
applications, or electronic marketplaces, seems largely undisputed (e.g. 
Croom, 2001; Smeltzer and Ruzicka, 2000). However, with regard to the 
wide range of solutions available, many firms still struggle with assessing e-
Procurement suitability for their purchasing processes and mainly adopt a 
‘wait and see’ approach. Moreover, there is no one best way to organise for 
purchasing synergy and to improve inter-organisational demand aggregation 
and purchasing co-ordination practices (Rozemeijer, 2000). A classification 
and categorisation of EPC structures and drivers is missing in literature.  
3. Research Methodology 
Based on this background, an overall statement is assessed: Effective 
participation in electronic purchasing consortia can have the potential to 
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enhance competitive advantage. Implementation therefore requires a clear 
and detailed understanding of the major process structures and drivers at the 
e-Marketplace/ PSP level of analysis. The analysis of the overall statement 
covers issues such as 
– Industry sectors, anti-trust limitations and take-up of electronic 
purchasing consortia. 
– The level of awareness and importance of electronic purchasing 
consortia and further customised services. 
– Management structures, trading mechanisms and scope of EPC. 
– Revenue models for electronic purchasing consortia. 
– Level of benefits and drawbacks of electronic purchasing consortia. 
– Critical factors in creating and managing electronic purchasing 
consortia. 
– Relationship between ROI and the use of electronic purchasing 
consortia. 
 
Five explorative case studies were conducted to obtain a first 
understanding of a conceptual framework of EPC structures and process 
drivers. The selection of cases was made to discover the whole variety of 
EPC trading mechanisms. 29 focused interviews have been conducted, the 
respondents of which were predominantly purchasing and IT managers. 
Further information has also been collected from secondary sources (e.g. 
internal reports, press releases). Figure 2 summarises the background of the 
explorative case studies.  
Figure 2  Case Study Origin 
 
Case Background 
1 Consortium-led OEM e-Marketplace in automotive industry 
2 Supplier-driven e-Marketplace in automotive industry 
3 Regional multi-industry purchasing consortium 
4 EPC software / procurement service provider in electronics industry 
5 E-Marketplace / procurement service provider in MRO industry 
 
However, case studies and other qualitative forms have long been 
criticised for their limitations in terms of generalisability to a larger 
population and the lack of sampling controls. Therefore, an online survey 
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instrument for e-Marketplaces and procurement service providers was 
additionally implemented and sent to 102 international active e-
Marketplaces and procurement service providers in the automotive, 
electronics and closely related industries. Reasons for the choice of the 
sectors derive from the background that both industries are pioneers and 
advanced in supply chain management and e-Procurement. By choosing a 
multi-method mix the disadvantageous effects of either approach may be 
minimised, while taking advantage of the creative potential of qualitative 
techniques as well as the analytics of quantitative techniques. The results of 
the case studies and the survey are presented in the following.  
4. Case Study Findings 
Figure 3 shows a first classification and categorisation of EPC structures 
and drivers derived from the case study findings in order to contrast 
conditions that help to frame operational measures (McCutcheon and 
Meredith, 1993). From the case research, it became clear that each EPC has 
its own characteristics and distinguishing marks governed by e.g. sourcing 
projects, industry sector, market position and buyer power, corporate 
strategy or structure. However, a range of EPC structures (e.g. five EPC 
trading mechanisms) and process drivers / enablers could be identified from 
the case studies. There is a great variety in EPC approaches to achieve 
purchasing synergy. Thus, the figure probably cannot provide a complete 
picture, but a valuable starting point for further research on EPC. 
While third-party intermediaries by definition per se do not cleanly fall 
into the EPC continuum between markets and hierarchy, the case study 
research found two categories of infomediaries that support EPC: The 
laissez-faire model, where the e-Marketplace / PSP typically acts as a lead 
source for purchasing organisations and suppliers and provides e.g. product 
information, customisation, specifications or exchange mechanisms in order 
to facilitate demand aggregation. In this way, the laissez-faire e-Marketplace 
/ PSP itself plays a passive role in negotiating on behalf of either seller or 
buyer, but provides the EPC infrastructure. The second mediated EPC 
operating model is one where the e-Marketplace / PSP acts as an active 
infomediary, which takes part in demand aggregation and negotiation 
strategies on behalf of buyers or suppliers. 
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 Pressures from Business Context 
 
 Corporate Structure and Firm Size 
 
 Co-opetition, Level of EPC Market Share (Buyer Power) and Anti-Trust Limitations 
 
 
 Level of Support for EPC Product Standardisation Initiatives  
(Homogeneity vs. Heterogeneity) 
 
 EPC Sourcing Strategies, Purchasing Spend and Product Pooling / Synergy Potential 
 
 
 Level of Distinctive Resources and Skills (Purchasing Maturity) 
 
 
 Breadth of Customised Services and Enabling Technology 
(Catalogue Systems, Intelligent Agents, Integration of ERP-Systems, etc.) 
 
 Level of EPC Anonymity 
Level of Additional Non-Electronic Support 
 
 
 Tangible EPC Benefits (Economies of Scale / Scope vs. Transaction Costs)  








Another classification involves the type of EPC market mechanism and 
negotiation processes. It was found from the case studies that several EPC 
trading and aggregation models exist that can range from: 
– EPC with electronic requests for quotation (e-RFQ) or reverse auctions. 
– Pre-production demand aggregation price curves, i.e. multiple buyers 
can electronically aggregate their orders around a supplier's pre-set and 
pre-production shipping date at the expense of additional inventory costs 
for purchasing organisations.  
– Time limited buy-cycles, i.e. prices continually amend in pre-set 
increments and time-frames as new group orders are electronically 
placed. 
– Buy-cycles with rebate schemes, i.e. an additional rebate is granted once 
the total number of purchasers has been electronically finalised. 
– Pre-negotiated infomediation, i.e. EPC providers pre-negotiate 
purchasing prices based on aggregated demand and electronically link 
buyers and suppliers, but do not take ownership of products. 
 
The findings from the case studies suggest that the fit and compatibility 
of the available EPC trading mechanisms and technology with 
organisations’ existing procurement practices play an important role. 
Overall, the presented EPC trading mechanisms are subject to a variety of 
further process enablers and drivers and firms have to decide on structural 
designs how EPC can be best integrated for particular sourcing projects. For 
example, the case study findings confirmed Rozemeijer (2000) that these 
structural designs can have a regional, national or global scope or can also 
vary between co-operation that is voluntary, informal, and initiated bottom-
up, and co-operation that is mandatory, formal and initiated top-down by top 
management. The structural designs can also include for example EPC 
revenue fees, which can vary between a mixture of e.g. transaction fees, 
fixed / monthly fees, initial licence fees or expenses paid on the basis of 
achieved cost savings. 
From the case studies it was also learnt that different EPC sourcing 
approaches can prevail. Systematic sourcing typically involves long-term 
buyer-supplier contracts and was strongly integrated into EPC with e-RFQ 
and reverse auctions as well as pre-production buy-cycles. However, 
information and communication technologies facilitate the initiation of EPC 
spot sourcing and co-operation in dynamic alliance networks that can be 
more short-term based and project-oriented. EPC therefore may range from 
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long term institutionalised entities to ad-hoc agreements between 
independent organisations. The case studies illustrated that dynamic EPC 
predominantly concentrate on commodities with rather low asset specificity 
and high product pooling potential. While stable networks may typically 
benefit from the construction of mutual trust, repeated co-operation and 
standardisation, dynamic EPC networks can temporarily integrate new 
external partners during any new sourcing project. Dynamic EPC can call 
on markets from an array of organisations to potentially respond more 
efficiently and effectively to market sourcing opportunities and potentially 
operate at lower cost than stable networks, but at the potential expense of 
standardisation and trust building initiatives.  
The level of anonymity between EPC partners is closely linked to the 
distinction between stable and dynamic EPC. When search costs and the 
advantages from long-term relationships are rather low, purchasers and 
sellers may typically interact with virtual anonymity, as is the case in highly 
liquid commodity markets. While EPC anonymity can potentially eliminate 
inefficiencies in the markets where product homogeneity prevails, there 
would be only limited opportunities for true anonymous EPC in the 
automotive and electronics industry since a large part of the products are 
rather complex and differentiated. In order to integrate a significant part of 
purchasing volume into EPC and to aggregate heterogeneous products 
among EPC members, it could be established from the case studies that 
active commodity management, product customisation and standardisation 
initiatives are required. A high level of collaboration between organisations 
can also require additional semi-automatic or non-electronic support (e.g. 
moderation services, face-to-face meetings).  
Since the EPC partners would have no physical contact, some of the 
qualities of face-to-face communication may not take effect. For instance, 
Spar and Bussang (1996) confirm the absence of established rules on the 
Internet, which according to their view leads to an uncertainty about the 
possible behaviour of the business partner. Challenges (such as shared 
understanding about EPC outcomes and how to achieve these outcomes or 
the integration of procurement skills and knowledge across systems, 
boundaries and cross-functional teams) are more salient in EPC with a high 
level of virtuality. The case study findings suggest that integrated EPC 
workflow processes should be able to support frequent formal and informal 
interaction between members in order to realise purchasing synergy and 
aggregate buyer power.  
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From a buyer power anti-trust point of view, industry-led e-
Marketplaces / PSPs are noteworthy because they bring together powerful 
groups of buyers. EPC that adopt an industry-wide (vertical) focus are 
typically reviewed in terms of the traditional trade commissions’ 
competition rules. In the case studies, anti-trust limitations did not appear 
for cross-industry (horizontal) EPC co-operation or for a geographical area. 
Although the trade commissions provided general guidelines and 
regulations on the treatment of consortium purchasing by competitors, they 
have still not ruled exactly on this issue for e-Marketplaces / PSPs. The 
legal conditions for EPC are still not fully clear and there is still some 
uncertainty as to how exactly the prohibition on illicit sensitive information 
exchange can and should operate with regard to EPC. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that e-Marketplaces / PSPs with industry dominating players will 
have to tread a fine line between procurement optimisation and restrictive 
behaviours such as forming an EPC monopsony or oligopsony.  
Another observation from the case studies is that pressures from the 
business context seem (e.g. cost reduction) to drive firms to take advantage 
of EPC potentials. Pressure to reduce costs was rather high in all cases. EPC 
may be an initiative to deal with these business pressures and to realise 
purchasing synergy in terms of tangible (e.g. net savings) or intangible 
benefits (e.g. know-how transfer, benchmarking of best practice). The 
multiple case studies highlighted different EPC trading mechanisms, process 
enablers and drivers, which can be used to enable a better understanding of 
the diversity of EPC approaches in practice. However, to add further 
empirical results, the results of the survey among e-Marketplaces / PSPs are 
presented in the following. 
5. Survey Results 
The survey instrument was a standardised questionnaire mainly 
composed of multiple choice questions and numeric questions. Any effects 
of personal bias were controlled to the degree that extensive pre-testing of 
the survey instruments with practitioners and academics sought to identify 
weaknesses in the make-up of questions or indeed identify omits. 
This pre-tested questionnaire was originally electronically sent to 196 
international active e-Marketplaces and procurement service providers in 
the automotive, electronics and closely related industries. Due to a 
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consolidation phase and decrease in the population of e-Marketplaces / 
PSPs, 94 of them had terminated their operations and the population was 
reduced to 102 e-Marketplaces / PSPs. The procedure to achieve a sufficient 
response rate and to obtain non-respondents’ data was an integrative 
process. First potential respondents were contacted four times during the 
first response period by e-Mail. Next, non-respondents in the surveys were 
contacted by phone and were interviewed on the level of current and future 
EPC implementation. This process could provide the grounding for a non-
respondent analysis. 34 e-Marketplaces / PSPs were willing to provide data 
to these two questions, but could not be motivated during the phone calls for 
full survey participation. Non-respondents were finally contacted up to four 
attempts by phone so that the full-survey coverage increased to a final 
response rate of 42% (i.e. 43 responses). 24 e-Marketplaces / PSPs were not 
at all interested in the research. This response rate can be considered as very 
satisfactory in comparison to other survey research.  
The non-response analysis from the 34 participants did not reveal any 
significant differences and indicated that the pattern of responses was 
reflective of the sample frame. Additionally, surveys were tested for 
statistically significant differences in the responses of early and late returned 
surveys. Again, no significant differences were found, suggesting that the 
sample is representative for the population. The geographic distribution of 
response shows that most participation came from Europe, followed by the 
US. All e-Marketplaces and PSPs were operated for profit; non-profit 
organisations did not participate in the survey.  
Electronic purchasing consortia were offered by 19 of the total 43 
participating e-Marketplaces and PSPs (44%). EPC are offered less in the 
automotive industry (39%) than in the electronics industry (65%). E-
Marketplaces and PSPs that offer electronic purchasing consortia tend to be 
buyer-centric. Overall, e-Marketplaces in general provide electronic 
purchasing consortia only in limited cases. Only 27% of e-Marketplaces 
offer EPC in comparison to 82% of PSPs. The findings suggest that e-
Marketplaces generally still have potential to develop and integrate EPC. 
Currently, it was found that most e-Marketplaces concentrate on automating 
purchasing and order replenishment processes, whereas PSPs focus more 
closely on strategic procurement. PSPs take advantage of semi-automatic or 
non-electronic communications tools as well that can assist in gaining 
purchasing managers’ trust to participate in electronic purchasing consortia. 
Few EPC providers among e-Marketplaces offer consulting services to 
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establish whether or not purchasing organisations would be generally 
willing to participate in EPC and to institute a certain level of trust between 
potential consortia members. The findings also suggest that PSPs, after 
having established an agreement to EPC, strongly support electronic 
implementation of RFx processes, e.g. reverse auctions. This is one of the 
reasons why the authors have set up the definition of EPC in such a way that 
the level of virtualisation may vary from case to case. Other non-electronic 
communications might be necessary as well.  
None of the industry consortia-led exchanges currently offer any 
electronic purchasing consortia. This appears worth noting because they 
would already have finished decisive phases of EPC such as finding 
partners, building up trust among the members and getting agreements in 
place. This finding confirms the case studies that industry consortia-led 
exchanges are typically set up by the major industry players and therefore 
demand aggregation might not be able to proceed due to anti-trust 
limitations. 60% of electronic purchasing consortia providers have requested 
legal approval before implementing EPC. The average number of 
competitors against non-competitors in the consortium is approx. 25%. This 
finding confirms that anti-trust is a major consideration to electronic 
purchasing consortia and that is why electronic purchasing consortia to date 
are mostly built by e-Marketplaces and PSPs for multi-sectoral consortia.  
Overall, e-Marketplaces / PSPs specified that there would be an increase 
of take-up of electronic purchasing consortia from 44% to 61% and an 
increase in the offering of reverse auctions from 63% to 79% in the future 
(defined as next five years). Moreover, e-Marketplaces / PSPs indicated a 
rise in the service provision of the combination EPC and reverse auctions 
from 28% presently to 56% in future. This future growth clearly stresses the 
awareness of both electronic purchasing consortia and reverse auctions to e-
Marketplaces and PSPs. In particularly, e-Marketplaces seem to have 
realised the potential of EPC and reverse auctions and try to add this 
functionality in future. E-Marketplaces and PSPs that have implemented 
electronic purchasing consortia and reverse auctions regard them as an 
essential part of their functionality and business strategy. However, EPC 
providers also specified that EPC and reverse auctions are just one element 
of their overall service provision and support them with more functionality 
and customised services such as legacy system integration, tracking and 
tracing, collaborative engineering, among others. The majority of e-
Marketplaces and PSPs seem to have realised the potential of more value 
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adding services and generally plan to add functionality in future in order to 
avoid building one-off, single-sided functions. Overall, EPC providers to 
date do not offer more functionality than non-providers.  
E-Marketplaces and PSPs cited the lack of firm participation as critical 
to its service offerings. Other major drawbacks specified for electronic 
purchasing consortia are potential anti-trust issues and that company secrets 
are perceived by purchasing managers not to be kept confidential to 
competitors. Firms that collaborate, even with non-competitors, may fear 
that firms may be directly or indirectly provided with sensitive competitive 
information (Hendrick, 1997). A high degree of trust among all participants 
and a strong management support are considered as vital factors for 
electronic purchasing consortia.  
For suppliers, drawbacks cited mainly include that the increased 
transparency in EPC can result in lower margins and more pressure from 
purchasing organisations. That is why strong suppliers, especially of 
strategic items, may resist participating in EPC. Hendrick (1997) explains 
that by keeping the members of an EPC as separate customers, they can 
extract higher margins that could be negotiated by the group. While 
collaboration with suppliers and other companies is perceived by 95% of all 
e-Marketplaces and PSPs as it is getting more important in the future, e-
Marketplaces / PSPs predominantly offer EPC solutions that focus on a 
rather transactional, arm’s length buyer-supplier relationship. E-
Marketplaces and PSPs acknowledged supplier benefits such as a quick 
access to large pools of buyers with lower sales costs and long-term 
business volume. Overall, EPC providers estimate the benefits of EPC on a 
higher scale and the drawbacks on a lower scale than non-providers. Having 
put EPC in practice, it seems that benefits can outweigh the drawbacks.  
Another factor to be taken into consideration is the product pooling 
potential: E-Marketplaces and PSPs generally estimate that 32% of their 
products could be pooled. Providers of EPC specify an average present 
product pooling of about 15% and acknowledge that there is still some 
potential to increase their average present pooling of products. In terms of 
revenue models, providers of both electronic purchasing and reverse 
auctions do not charge solely suppliers at all. 50% of EPC providers charge 
only buyers; the other half charges both suppliers and buyers. Hendrick 
(1997) found that purchasing consortia have in most cases no direct fees and 
each member contributes expense coverage, time and effort about equally. 
The survey confirmed the case study findings that for EPC, there seems to 
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some shift to a mixture of revenue models such as the payment of expenses 
based on a percentage of purchases, fixed monthly / yearly revenues or fees 
paid as a percentage of cost savings. One explanation for this finding can be 
that for example the fees paid as a percentage of cost savings can have more 
immediate benefits and ROI for purchasing organisations. Less financial 
risk can be involved and outsourcing can take precedence.  
In terms of tangible benefits, providers of electronic purchasing 
consortia specify an average saving in purchasing costs of 12.4% with 
demand aggregation. With EPC, member companies have to invest an 
average of 7.0% of purchasing costs for setting-up and managing the 
electronic purchasing consortium. As a result, an average net saving of 5.4% 
and a ROI of 77% can be calculated for companies that participate in EPC. 
For reverse auctions, a higher ROI results: The average savings (in % of 
purchasing costs) for buyers in reverse auctions were 16.1%. The average 
buyer investment for reverse auctions (in % of purchasing costs) was 4.6%. 
The result is a net saving of 11.6% and a ROI of 254%. However, there 
usually is a cut off point or minimum amount to order to conduct a reverse 
auction effectively. Providers of reverse auctions specify that there should 
be an average minimum amount of 51,000 euros of a specific product 
demand to run a profitable reverse auction. This finding reveals that 
electronic demand bundling can well be a prerequisite for smaller 
purchasing organisations to obtain the required purchase volume for a 
profitable reverse auction. Providers of both EPC and reverse auctions claim 
to achieve average savings (in % of purchasing costs) of 28.5% by the 
combination of EPC and reverse auctions. The average investment (in % of 
purchasing costs) for both EPC and reverse auctions is 11.1%. 
Consequently, an average net saving of 17.4% and a ROI of 155% results by 
the combination of both reverse auctions and electronic purchasing 
consortia. Obviously, this tandem can achieve significant net savings and 
ROI. There was no statistical evidence that the more customised services are 
offered by e-Marketplaces / PSPs, the higher the general net savings in 
purchasing costs achieved. Presently, providers of EPC and reverse auctions 
seem to be quite satisfied and positive about electronic purchasing consortia 
and reverse auctions. Figure 4 summarises the key survey findings. 
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Figure 4  Key Survey Findings 
 
• EPC offered by 27% of e-Marketplaces and by 82% of procurement service 
providers. 
• Future EPC adoption among e-Marketplaces / PSPs will increase. 
• Anti-trust limitations require legal approval, in particular for consortium-led 
e-Marketplaces. 
• E-Marketplaces / PSPs try to add customised services to avoid building 
single-sided functions. 
• Average economies of scale and scope exceed EPC transaction and 
communication costs. 
• A mixture of funding options for EPC is provided by e-Marketplaces / PSPs. 
6. Discussion of Findings 
All in all the results demonstrate that, despite some scepticism and 
drawbacks, electronic purchasing consortia, it is perceived, will become 
more important in the future. The overall consensus is positive. New 
electronic metamediaries such as e-Marketplaces and procurement service 
providers have the potential to interpose themselves between suppliers and 
buyers by taking advantage of new types of economies of scale, scope and 
knowledge, enabled by ICT, in particular the Internet.  
However, the analysis of EPC process structures and drivers among e-
Marketplaces / PSPs also reveals that major barriers exist to adoption: For 
example, legal limitations can evolve, which are, according to the trade 
commissions, amenable to traditional anti-trust analysis. The further EPC 
extend beyond the ‘safe harbour’, which under EU guidelines is fixed at 
15%, the greater the risk of a negative competitive effect. In the US, if less 
than 20 percent of a market is affected by an exclusive arrangement, the 
practice will likely avoid regulatory scrutiny because it falls within the 
antitrust safety zone. Anti-trust limitations can be one of the reasons why 
EPC are offered less in the automotive industry (39%) than in the 
electronics industry (65%).  
What differentiates the electronics industry from the automotive is 
higher volatile demand, more rapid inventory depreciation and a more 
dynamic character. The electronics industry is not as vertically integrated 
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and concentrated as the automotive industry, which makes it a better 
candidate for EPC models. Potential anti-trust limitations are more likely to 
arise in the oligopsonistic automotive industry. For example, the consortia-
led e-Marketplace Covisint specifies on its website: “First, Covisint will not 
aggregate the purchases of one OEM with those of another OEM. Second, 
Covisint will not offer aggregated purchasing services for any automotive-
specific parts or materials. Third, Covisint's future aggregated purchases of 
non-automotive specific parts (such as office supplies, cleaning supplies, 
etc.) will always be within the applicable competitive law guidelines in the 
market in which the purchases are made.”  
By forming EPC within Covisint, several OEMs would dominate the 
automotive purchasing share world-wide. Due to regulatory issues consortia 
of automotive manufacturers will not be allowed to pool their demand for 
production parts. Nonetheless, Covisint has taken a very conservative 
approach: Demand aggregation between OEMs and tier 1 suppliers (for e.g. 
raw materials) which is common practice in the automotive industry was 
also not integrated. EPC providers have to establish means by which the 
risks of collusion of anti-trust can be ameliorated, e.g. by erecting firewalls 
to prevent access by competitors to certain information, by implementing 
the use of nondisclosure or confidentiality agreements or by restricting EPC 
membership when members’ purchasing volumes approach 15% of the 
respective product market. In this respect, the ongoing dialogue between 
trade commissions, e-Marketplaces / PSPs and purchasing organisations is a 
prerequisite to fully take advantage of EPC potentials.  
E-Marketplaces / PSPs also cited further challenges to EPC such as a not 
adequate training and education of purchasing managers in EPC, a low 
degree of information on change management and, rather self-critically, a 
lack of maturity in service offerings. E-Marketplaces and PSPs realised that 
they have to add services and functionality in future. Currently available 
EPC solutions are still some way from covering the entire spectrum of 
procurement requirements. It was also found that e-Procurement of complex 
modules with high asset specificity are more difficult to proceed by EPC 
because the parts are rarely sourced entirely on the basis of price, but on 
concept competition, supplier capabilities and in most cases single sourcing. 
Lapidus (2000) assumes that only 20% of sales in the automotive industry 
are commodity purchases, which would be more suitable for EPC due to 
their lower asset specificity. Some conflict with electronic purchasing 
consortia was identified in the concentrated auto industry, with its module 
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structure, fierce competition and overcapacity and therefore take-up of EPC 
among e-Marketplaces / PSPs in this industry is relatively low.  
Effective participation in electronic purchasing consortia has the 
potential to enhance competitive advantage in the automotive industry, but 
this potential is limited due to e.g. the concentration of the sector (legal 
issues), cultural impediments and technical factors (modularised assembly). 
More horizontal integrated and fragmented industry sectors such as the 
electronics industry are better suited to adopt EPC. Moreover, the 
electronics industry with its high-velocity product cycles and swings in 
demand have aggressively embraced outsourcing, contract manufacturing 
and reintermediation, which may contribute to the higher level of EPC 
implementation. However, e-Marketplaces / PSPs further specified that 
many purchasing organisations have not yet evolved to the stage where they 
are joining e-Marketplaces / PSPs in any significant numbers. They will 
have to overcome this fundamental hurdle before strategic sourcing teams 
are joining EPC and applying strategic leverage on the supply base.  
7. Conclusion 
As firms are increasingly adopting ICT in their supply chain operations, 
the need to empirically research EPC was identified. Although it was 
demonstrated that EPC may add to competitive advantage and result in an 
average positive return on investment, sophisticated employment and 
diffusion of electronic purchasing consortia is still very much at a 
developmental stage in industry. From the research, it is apparent that EPC, 
despite limitations, can be a valuable strategic tool worth consideration 
inside an integrated supply chain model.  
While dependant on industry sector characteristics, the model of 
electronic purchasing consortia can represent a strategic procurement 
direction for the future and is developing in an evolutionary rather than in a 
revolutionary manner. The findings and the developed framework represent 
a starting point for further EPC theory development and indicate that EPC is 
a rich, multi-faceted domain. However, much work still needs to be carried 
out if the use of this type of electronic network is to be more widely adopted 
in industrial firms. Electronic purchasing consortia are still in their infancy 
and research is still in conceptual and theoretical flux. 
21 
8. References 
Amit R., Zott C., (2001), «Value Creation in E-Business», Strategic Management 
Journal, Vol. 22, pp. 493-520 
Arnold U., (1996), «Cooperative Purchasing as a Challenge for Business-to-
Business-Marketing: Results from an Action Research Project», Proceedings of 
the 25th EMAC Conference: Marketing for an Expanding Europe, Budapest, 
14-17 May, pp. 1367-1384 
Bakos J.Y., Treacy M.E., (1996), «Information Technology and Corporate 
Strategy: A Research Perspective», MIS Quarterly, Vol. 20(2), pp. 107-119 
Barney J.B., (1991), «Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage», 
Journal of Management, Vol. 17, pp. 99-120 
Boer L. de, Harink J., Heijboer G., (2002), «A model for assessing the impact of 
electronic procurement forms», European Journal of Purchasing & Supply 
Management, Vol. 8(2), pp. 25-33 
Corsten D., Zagler M., (1999), «Purchasing Consortia and Internet Technology», 
Proceedings of the 8th Annual IPSERA Conference, Belfast and Dublin, 28-31 
March, pp. 139-147 
Croom S.R., (2001), Supply Chain Management in the E-Business Era, Coventry, 
University of Warwick 
Davenport T.H., Short J.E., (1990), «The New Industrial Engineering: Information 
Technology and Business Process Redesign», Sloan Management Review, Vol. 
31(4), pp. 11-27 
Essig M., (1999), «Cooperative Sourcing as a New Strategic Supply Concept: 
Theoretical Framework and Empirical Findings», Proceedings of the 8th 
Annual IPSERA Conference, Belfast and Dublin, 28-31 March, pp. 245-256 
Essig M., (2000), «Purchasing Consortia as Symbiotic Relationships: Developing 
the Concept of Consortium Sourcing», European Journal of Purchasing & 
Supply Management, Vol. 6(1), pp. 13-22 
Gebauer J., Zagler M., (2000), Assessing the Status Quo and Future of B2B E-
Commerce, [on-line at: 
www.wmrc.com/businessbriefing/pdf/euroifpmm2001/reference/53.pdf] 
Gulati R., (1998), «Alliances and networks», Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 
19(4), pp. 293-317 
Harland C.M., (2002), «Supply Relationships, Chains and Networks: A 
Behavioural Perspective», Green Supply Chain Partnerships Workshop, 
22 
Fontainebleau, Insead, May 16, [on-line at: www.insead.edu/CMER/events/ 
gscpworkshop/papers/Paper_Harland.doc] 
Hendrick T.E., (1997), Purchasing Consortiums: Horizontal Alliances Among 
Firms Buying Common Goods and Services. What? Who? Why? How?, Tempe, 
Center for Advanced Purchasing Studies / National Association of Purchasing 
Management 
Housley C.E., (1983), Hospital Purchasing, Rockville, Aspen Systems Corp. 
Jarillo J.C., (1988), «On Strategic Networks», Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 
9(1), pp. 31-41 
Knudsen D., (2002), «Uncovering the strategic domain of e-procurement», 
Uncovering the strategic domain of e-procurement, Enschede, Twente 
University, 25-27 March, [on-line at: 
www.tlog.lth.se/documents/publications/Knudsen_2002_IPSERA.pdf] 
Lapidus G., (2000), eAutomotive 
Major M.J., (1997), «Purchasing´s Best Kept Secret», Purchasing Today, May 1, p. 
23 
Malone T.W., Tates J., Benjamin R.I., (1987), «Electronic market and electronic 
hierarchies», Communications of the ACM, Vol. 30(6), pp. 484-497 
McCutcheon D.M., Meredith J.R., (1993), «Conducting case study research in 
operations management», Journal of Operations Management, Vol. 11, pp. 
239-256 
Montgomery C.A., Wernerfelt B., (1988), «Diversification, Ricardian rents, and 
Tobin's q», RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 19(4), pp. 623-632 
Porter M.E., (1985), Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior 
Performance, New York, The Free Press 
Quayle M., (2002), «E-Commerce the challenge for UK SME's in the 21st 
Century», International Journal of Operations & Productions Management, 
Vol. 22(10), pp. 1148-1161 
Richmond C., Power T., O'Sullivan D., (1998), E-Business in the Supply Chain: 
Creating Value in a Networked Market Place, London, Financial Times Retail 
& Consumer 
Rozemeijer F., (2000), Creating Corporate Advantage in Purchasing 
Smeltzer L., Ruzicka M., (2000), «Electronic Reverse Auctions: Integrating the 
Tool with the Strategic-Sourcing Process», Practix, June, pp. 1-6 
Spar D., Bussang J.J., (1996), «Ruling the Net», Harvard Business Review, Vol. 
74(3), pp. 125-133 
USFTC - U.S. Federal Trade Commission, (2000), Entering the 21st Century: 
Competition Policy in the World of B2B Electronic Marketplaces, Washington 
23 
D.C., A Report by Federal Trade Commission Staff, [on-line at: 
www.ftc.gov/os/2000/10/b2breport.pdf] 
Vigoroso M., (1998), «Buying Consortiums suit Some, not All», Purchasing, Vol. 
125(2), pp. 18-19 
Weele A.J. van, (1999), «Purchasing and the information age: towards a virtual 
purchasing organisation?», WMRC Business Briefing European and Logistics 
Strategies, London, pp. 45-51, [on-line at: www.reedsresearch.com/ 
SupplyMgt/VANWEELE.pdf, 
www.nijenrode.nl/download/cscm/art_avweele2.PDF] 
Wigand R.T., Benjamin R.I., (1996), «Electronic commerce: effects on electronic 
markets», Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, Vol. 1(3), pp. 163-
188 
Williamson O.E., (1975), Market and Hierachies: Analysis and Antitrust 
Implications, New York, The Free Press 
About the Authors: 
Bernd Huber (bernd.huber@dit.ie) is a PhD candidate at the National 
Institute for Transport and Logistics, Dublin Institute of Technology, 
Ireland. His research focuses on the interrelationship between information 
and communication technologies and procurement strategies, in particular 
consortium purchasing strategies.  
Edward Sweeney (edward.sweeney@dit.ie) is Director of Learning at 
the National Institute for Transport and Logistics, Dublin Institute of 
Technology, Ireland. His research focuses on supply chain management 
strategies and the linkages to people related issues such as training and 
education.  
Austin Smyth (austin.smyth@dit.ie) is Director General at the National 
Institute for Transport and Logistics, Dublin Institute of Technology, 
Ireland, and Professor at the Department of Economics, Napier University, 
UK. His research interests include supply chain management and transport 
strategies, in particular attitudinal research techniques, appraisal, evaluation 
and assessment procedures. 
National Institute for Transport and Logistics (NITL), Dublin Institute of 
Technology, 17 Herbert Street, Dublin 2, Ireland.  
Tel: +353-1-644-5716. Fax: +353-1-6611943. 
http://www.nitl.ie 
